On November 15, the new premises of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) were officially opened.
Since the current working conditions of SAB, including the location of structural units, created more and more challenges for ensuring NATO and EU security standards in order to realize the full performance of SAB&#8217;s functions, a building located in the vicinity of Brasa was renovated for SAB&#8217;s needs.
The building and the area adjacent to it are a part of the former War Hospital building complex. This complex is an architectural monument of national significance "Hospital building and park", where historical evidence has been preserved, combining them with security requirements corresponding to the service.
“May the war doctors who served here, who once protected and restored the health of wounded soldiers, serve as an example to the employees of the Constitution Protection Bureau, fulfilling their official duties and protecting the country of Latvia, its independence and security," emphasized Egils Zviedris, director of SAB, when opening the new service premises.
The restoration and reconstruction project of this building was developed for the needs of SAB in 2017. The works were started in the fall of 2020. Before the reconstruction started, the building was not operated and since 2012 it had been standing empty. Taking into account the critical state of the building&#8217;s structures, large-scale dismantling works were carried out, building new floor coverings, roof structures and roof, windows and doors, as well as installing new communications.
A special testimony to the fact that the building once housed a military hospital are the names of the medical facilities located in the premises. The rooms are named after the seven prominent doctors of the military hospital, colonels and generals, who managed this medical complex from 1919 to 1940. These names will continue to remind us of the role of Latvian army officers and the importance of this place in the history of Latvia.
SAB&#8217;s legal address is Straumes iela 1, Riga, but visitors and couriers should use the entrance from Upes iela to enter SAB&#8217;s territory. According to the service’s specifics, the premises of the SAB service are not publicly accessible. The only areas where visitors are allowed are several meeting and interview rooms.
Communication with SAB remains in its current form - by phone, e-mail or, with prior agreement on a visit, in person. SAB administrative phone number: 67025407, e-mail: pasts@sab.gov.lv. Detailed contact information is available on the SAB&#8217;s website <a href="https://sab.gov.lv/en/contact-us/">www.sab.gov.lv</a>.
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Photo: SAB
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Photo: Ilmārs Znotiņš

The new premises of the Constitution Protection Bureau have been officially opened

One of the most frequently discussed topics in the context of the Ukrainian war for more than two and a half years is the potential peace talks. Calls from politicians and officials to come to the negotiating table regularly appear in the media, offering various plans that could serve as a basis for peace talks, including from countries not directly involved in the hostilities. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there have even been several rounds of talks between Russia and Ukraine through various mediators, but so far these have not produced results beyond POW exchanges. In this context, attention must be paid to the factors that influence the likelihood of peace talks and their potential outcome.
While two countries are directly involved in the war, the indirect impact of the war affects a much larger number of countries. This means that the course of the war, and thus the opening of peace negotiations, can be directly or indirectly influenced by other countries. Given the dynamics of war, the political positions of states can change in the context of war, resulting in a set of interrelated factors influencing peace negotiations, which are discussed further below.
Strategic factors
The primary factor directly influencing the willingness and interest of the parties to enter negotiations is the situation at the frontlines. In the context of war, the belligerents make a calculation as to which instruments are better suited to achieve the desired objectives in the given situation. Confidence in one&#8217;s ability to achieve political objectives through military means reduces the interest in entering negotiations and risks undermining the maximum gains that can achieved by having the initiative on the battlefield. What is happening on the battlefield is an important consideration for negotiating positions: superiority and initiative at the front mean a greater ability to impose terms on the other side, as the weaker side is more inclined to cease hostilities. Consequently, the initiation and development of peace negotiations requires an understanding on the part of the parties involved that this is an acceptable instrument for protecting their interests and achieving their objectives.
In the context of the peace talks, it is important to highlight the Istanbul peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, which took place in April 2022 and were mediated by Turkey. During the negotiations, the parties reached an initial agreement on Ukraine&#8217;s future status - military neutrality, reduced armed forces, but with the possibility of joining the European Union (EU), while the status of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk would be addressed in further negotiations. The so-called Istanbul Communiqué is a draft agreement to which Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin, regularly refer to in their statements. In this way, Russia is attempting to portray itself as ready for negotiations, while referring to a narrative that no longer reflects the current situation. The actual concessions made by Ukraine were influenced by the local and international context: only a month and a half since the start of the full-scale invasion, there was uncertainty about Ukraine&#8217;s ability to defend itself successfully, as well as about the willingness and ability of Western countries to provide Ukraine with the necessary military and economic support. Ukraine&#8217;s willingness to compromise was also influenced by the disclosure of crimes committed by the Russian Armed Forces in the occupied territories, which had repercussions for both Ukrainian and Western societies: it became clear what the population in other occupied territories would be subjected to, while reinforcing the view that this should not be allowed to go unpunished.
The second factor influencing the start, progress and ultimately the implementation of peace talks is the support of the societies involved. Public attitudes towards peace negotiations confer legitimacy on the officials who participate in the negotiation process on behalf of the state, and public support, or lack thereof, reflects not only on the domestic political situation, but also on the state&#8217;s ability to implement the agreement. This issue is particularly important for Ukraine, whose democratic system allows the people to express their opinion and thus their approval for a ceasefire or a negotiated end to the war. Sociological data from March of 2024 illustrate a complex situation, with 43% of the public in favour of negotiating peace with Russia. However, the majority of the public opposes the idea of renouncing EU or NATO membership and is categorically opposed to the proposal to reduce the size and capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces. The data also show that the Ukrainian public would not be prepared to accept what they see as an unjust peace, with most of the population acknowledging their preparedness to demand a change of government in such a situation.
The peace negotiation process thus brings with it a complex domestic political dimension, in which society participates as a stakeholder in the debate on what constitutes a just peace. A negotiated settlement without public support can foster feelings of resentment and grievance, which in turn can manifest itself not only domestically but also in foreign policy settings, for example by calling for an aggressive or revanchist foreign policy. In this context, the depolitisation of Russian society, combined with the state&#8217;s monopoly on the information space, means that the public is potentially more willing to accept the Kremlin&#8217;s position. Ending the war without a complete capitulation of Ukraine would provoke resistance in some parts of society, but the general tendency of Russian society to accommodate the Kremlin&#8217;s positions would prevail, complemented by the range of repressive instruments available to the Kremlin. It should be stressed that ending the war poses significant long-term domestic political challenges for Russia, for example in terms of demobilisation of soldiers or state budget planning.
The domestic political situation in Western countries is a much-discussed factor. Ukraine&#8217;s position in the war is closely linked to the political resources of its international partners, and consequently the mood of Western publics, including the elites, towards Ukraine which can directly exert pressure in favour of an early start of peace talks and a quicker compromise. Ukraine is clearly aware of its position and part of its public diplomacy since February 2022 has been aimed directly at Western societies with the aim of explaining why Ukraine needs to be supported. One of Ukraine&#8217;s objectives in invading the Kursk region in the summer of 2024 was precisely to demonstrate its offensive capabilities in order to prevent the view of Ukraine losing taking root. However, recent domestic political developments in some Western countries show that the slogan of the need to cut aid to Ukraine is not a marginal one. In the recent regional parliamentary elections in Germany, parties whose rhetoric, among other promises, advocates normalisation of relations with Russia and a halt to military support for Ukraine made significant gains in two states. The opinion of Western societies points to a potential vulnerability - risk tolerance. Russia has a higher risk tolerance, i.e., a willingness to risk escalation that stems from Russia&#8217;s foreign policy principles. Russia has demonstrated this, for example, by conducting nuclear saber-rattling. In contrast, the logic of Western action is focused on escalation control and the need to avoid unplanned escalation. Russia has long sought to exploit this asymmetry against Western societies, and there is no reason to believe that Russia will stop it any time soon, even though it has not yet brought any clear benefits.
Far-reaching consequences
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is also very important in the context of the international political system. Russia has repeatedly postulated that its foreign policy is aimed at changing the existing rule-based international system into a multi-polar one. Peace negotiations leading to the legitimisation of Russia&#8217;s control over the occupied territories of Ukraine would create a dangerous precedent in which unprovoked aggression by a nuclear power, also including war crimes, would not be stopped or clearly punished. Although such a precedent would not mean an immediate repetition of the scenario elsewhere in the world, but it would seriously undermine the credibility and prestige of the current international system, especially the Western powers as the main enforcers of the international rules. It would, in fact, demonstrate that it is possible to unleash aggression and then force the victim to make concessions without adequate punishment. This is linked to a moral problem for Ukraine, namely that concessions to Russia would mean not only a legal renunciation of its own territories, but also of the Ukrainian citizens living in the occupied territories, who would thus lose hope and possibly a way of returning to Ukraine. The most fundamental problem would be precisely to make concessions to an aggressor state that has committed crimes against the Ukrainian people, and such concessions would have to be accepted not only by the Ukrainian society, but also by the Western.
One of the central issues in inter-state relations is the fulfilment of commitments. In the Ukrainian context, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine&#8217;s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons clearly illustrates this problem. This is an agreement signed by Ukraine, Russia, the UK and the US to provide Ukraine with security assurances in the context of its commitment to non-proliferation. The first point of the Memorandum is the signatories&#8217; guarantee to respect Ukraine&#8217;s independence, sovereignty and borders. Understandably, such recent experience with non-compliance is sensitive for Ukraine and affects its perception of other types of negotiations.
The Minsk agreements signed in 2014 and 2015 were aimed at stopping hostilities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and creating a framework for resolving political and military issues. Practice has clearly shown that the implementation of agreements can be delayed and, in fact, sabotaged in the name of various interests. Ukraine&#8217;s experience also shows that the involvement of international observers does not guarantee the implementation of commitments if they do not have clear instruments of coercion at their disposal. The implementation of agreements and the willingness to comply are determined by the countries themselves, which can undermine national and public support for peace negotiations. Regarding Ukraine, the potential involvement of third parties in providing guarantees is sometimes considered, but this does not exclude the possibility that countries simply might not adhere to negotiated settlements.
The final problem, which forms the basis for any amicable settlement, is mutual mistrust. The negotiating parties, and especially the warring parties, must be able to trust the other side that the agreement will be honoured in the long term and lead to changes in policy and behaviour. Despite Russia’s different and conflicting explanations for the invasion’s objectives, long-term peace in Ukraine requires confidence that Russia will not use it to buy time and prepare for a new invasion. Similarly, Russia would need confidence that the sanctions imposed against it will be eased over time and that Ukraine&#8217;s relations with Western countries, particularly in the area of security policy, will not be deepened. The fact that this conflict of interests exists at the strategic level makes it difficult to build mutual trust. That is to say, the West wants its neighbours to be stable and highly developed, while Russia wants its neighbours to be weak and therefore easily influenced. Mutual mistrust can be mitigated by cooperation in other areas and gradually expanded, thus demonstrating a willingness to build constructive relations, but this does not address the root cause of mistrust. The war is caused by Russia&#8217;s foreign policy, and long-term peace inherently requires a change in Russia&#8217;s political outlook, which is not something that is currently on the table and is also viewed sceptically by the Ukrainian public.
The above mentioned factors illustrate the complexity of the negotiation process and the path to it. Each of the factors involve several aspects and considerations which are dynamic and dependent on processes both within and outside the belligerents. The factors may be complementary or even mutually exclusive, making the overall situation dynamic, and therefore inherently impossible to predict the initiation, progress and successful conclusion of the negotiation process with certainty. It is important to stress that negotiations and an active war are not mutually exclusive - they can take place simultaneously, thus influencing the negotiating positions. The negotiation process can be influenced by third parties, but the final say on the outcome and implementation of the negotiated terms belongs to Russia and Ukraine.
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Prospects for Russia – Ukraine peace talks

From now on the legal address of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) will be Straumes street 1, Riga.
Communication with SAB remains as previously - by phone, e-mail or in person, arranging the visit in advance. SAB’s administrative phone number: 67025407, e-mail: pasts@sab.gov.lv. Detailed contact information is available <a href="https://sab.gov.lv/en/contact-us/">here</a>.
To enter the territory, visitors and couriers should use the entrance from the side of Upes street.
When visiting SAB premises, an identity document (passport or ID card) must be presented and a security check passed.
It is forbidden to carry into the SAB&#8217;s premises the mobile phones, other devices and equipment to record, save, transmit, or receive information, as well as weapons and any objects or substances that can be used for attack and can pose a threat to a person&#8217;s life, health or property.
The devices and items carried with the visitor will be securely stored in a special locker during the visit.
The service is moving to the new premises gradually. The official opening will follow.

New address for the Constitution Protection Bureau

Ever since Vladimir Putin became President of Russia in 1999, there has been a gradual increase in repression of democratic freedoms and rights in Russia and a centralization of decision-making. With the strengthening of authoritarianism, there has been an increased tendency to use ideological explanations for legitimization of this process. For example, portraying Russia as a so-called “sovereign democracy” and thus explaining the limitations of individual rights and freedoms in Russia. In recent years, especially since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, there has been increased ideologization to explaining and justifying the domestic and foreign political activities of Russia’s ruling regime and offering a certain narrative about the relationship between the society and the ruling elite. At the same time the ideologization process does not mean that there exists a single, unified ideology in Russia.
One area where ideologization is evident is Russia&#8217;s international role. Traditionally, Russia&#8217;s international status and role is based on the legacy of the Russian Empire and the USSR. It is possible to observe the selective use of historical examples to highlight Russia&#8217;s importance to European security, such as the role of the Russian Empire in defeating Napoleon in the early 19th century, and particularly the role played by the USSR in the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II. More similarities with the USSR&#8217;s ideology have been emerging since 2014 as tensions in Russia&#8217;s relations with the West intensified. Antagonism towards the West, has been placed at the heart of modern Russia&#8217;s geopolitical view and is manifested in several sectors.
In the rhetoric of senior Russian officials, using NATO expansion and Western aid to Ukraine as examples, the West is portrayed as Russia&#8217;s primary security threat. Western aggressive security policy is contrasted with Russia&#8217;s supposedly constructive and open approach, for example by offering to be part of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Western and especially U.S. aggression toward Russia is illustrated through their arms deliveries to Ukraine, including the supply of weapons systems to be used against targets on Russian soil and allowing strikes to take place.
The West is being positioned as a threat to Russia&#8217;s “unique values”. Russian society is told that Russia is the only guardian of Russian values. Much of the public rhetoric is devoted to emphasizing the special place of Russia&#8217;s supposedly unique culture, values and even Russia as a specific civilization in the world, while maintaining these principles relatively abstract and therefore applicable at selected opportunities. Given Russia&#8217;s geopolitical positioning, it is often accentuated that the struggle with the West is not just political or military, but ideologically existential. It is not only Russia&#8217;s political survival, but Russia&#8217;s survival as a civilization, that is at stake. It is important to emphasize that in its civilizational view Russia considers not only Russian citizens, but also compatriots living outside Russia. Consequently, Russia&#8217;s political and ideological confrontation with the West is framed for internal society as an existential battle for the survival of Russia as a nation and civilization, confronting an aggressive and imperialist West.
Russia&#8217;s role as the guardian of “unique Russian values” and civilization is important for mobilizing the country&#8217;s society and justifying the authoritarian political regime. As a necessity to protect the public against Western “aggression” and values, the creation of an appropriate highly centralized decision-making system has also been enshrined in amendments to the Russian constitution in 2012 and 2020, fortifying what is known as the vertical of power with Vladimir Putin as a key figure.
With Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine, the cult of Putin&#8217;s personality as Russia&#8217;s leader has become increasingly apparent. Putin&#8217;s stay in power has been tied to Russia&#8217;s survival and stability, while his re-election as President is a testament and public legitimacy to the decisions he has made. Putin&#8217;s own image has become inextricably linked to the qualities and objectives, interests and mission attributed to Russia in the international system. Within the country, Putin is designed as a guarantor for the economic stability and development of society and embodies Russia&#8217;s values - traditionality, Christianity and development. Russian authorities and the political elite which includes both those close to the President and a wider range of officials whose prosperity is directly linked to the regime are being consolidated around Putin&#8217;s personality.
In the current ideological construct Russia’s society has been allocated the role of supporting political elite and its worldview and given the opportunity to participate in the fight for Russia&#8217;s unique values and the protection of its civilization. This manifestation of Russian patriotism includes the concept of a “hero&#8217;s death” (preparedness to sacrifice) highlighted in Kremlin propaganda messages related to the invasion of Ukraine. In exchange for supporting the regime and its interests, the Russian “social contract” of Putin&#8217;s time provides stability in the country and protection from the threats imagined by the Kremlin, as well as the possibility for individuals to be part of Russian society, that is portrayed as rooted in history, united and superior in terms of values and morals to others.
The transformation of the country&#8217;s economy has become a priority in Russian politics. This is determined by the resources needed to wage war in the Ukraine and the impact of international sanctions. The ability of Russian domestic producers to offer better products in terms of quality and price than Western ones is increasingly emphasized in Russia’s public space. This is used to highlight Russia&#8217;s ability to develop not only the economy, but to create an economic model and financial system that is independent and self-sufficient in the long-term.
The high degree of control of the information space in Russia provides a favorable environment for ideologization to take place. The regime also dominates the cultural space – media, film and theatre, books – by introducing censorship and restrictions on the distribution of certain authors works. There is a growing focus on youth indoctrination, including the realization of patriotic education in schools and universities based on a politicized interpretation of Russian history and so-called traditional values (stemming from Orthodox and other cultural and historical aspects). Russia&#8217;s education policies demonstrate a strategy that includes political propaganda, such as demonstrating Putin&#8217;s official addresses, military training and the promotion of aggression against gender, sexual, ethnic, racial, religious groups. Students are taught “politically correct” history and support is being given to behaviors that include censorship of the views of “foreign agents,” or denial of liberal-democratic values, and full acceptance of the state&#8217;s teachings.
Russia&#8217;s ideological tendencies mark the vectors of Russian policy development. The antagonistic approach to international policy, especially in relation to Western countries, illustrates Russia&#8217;s readiness for further confrontation, not only in the field of security and economics, but also in the field of values. As Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine continues, Russia will tend to build cooperation with non-Western countries, primarily to mitigate economic losses and form a group of anti-Western countries. The inclusion of the Russian diaspora into Russian civilization, in turn, provides the basis for Russia to continue to present itself as the defender of the diasporas living outside Russia and of everything Russian, implying potential interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
Internally, ideologization is focused on the stability and survival of Russia&#8217;s regime, not the broader Russian state or society. The interests of the ruling regime have become the interests of the state, but the primary guardian of these interests – Vladimir Putin – has been placed at the center of it. Such an ideological construct illustrates the leading regime&#8217;s interest in maintaining its positions also under war conditions, giving the public the illusion of no alternatives. The investments made in the indoctrination of young people show the willingness to maintain its power position in the long-term as well and to dissuade the strength of the political opposition. The intensification of ideologization in Russia may signal the regime&#8217;s efforts to create additional resources for mobilization and its legitimization for the society in the face of a gradual socio-economic decline. At the same time, the regime&#8217;s control over political, economic processes and the information space makes it possible to adapt elements of ideological content to changes in external or internal situations.
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This article by the Constitution Protection Bureau is published in a series of articles on various topics that are current in society. The purpose of the series of articles is to provide expertise on important issues for Latvian society, in order to supplement the informational space with reliable information that would serve the citizens as an explanation of current processes in the country and a forecast for their development.

Russia`s ideologization: building self-sufficient empire

Please find below Annual Public Reports of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB). Public reports partially contain the information which is included in SAB’s report to the Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia (the Government).

Neutralisation of activities of intelligence and security services unfriendly to Latvia.

Obtaining background information on activities of foreign institutions or persons against the interests of the Latvian state.

Issuance of special permits for access to state secrets. Protection of EU and NATO classified information.

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Please find below Annual Public Reports of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB). Public reports partially contain the information which is included in SAB’s report to the Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia (the Government).

Annual reports

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