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SAB Director Egils Zviedris is participating in the Munich Security Conference from 13 to 15 February, where the most important foreign and security policy issues will be discussed.
During the conference, the SAB Director will meet with heads of security services, as well as other security experts, to jointly discuss the most important current events in the context of global, European and Baltic security.
The Munich Security Conference is the world&#8217;s leading forum for international security policy, bringing together more than 450 high-level decision-makers and leaders from around the world. It is a place for diplomatic initiatives to address the world&#8217;s most pressing security challenges and draw attention to important issues with the potential to soon rise to the top of the security community&#8217;s agenda.

SAB’s Director participates in Munich Security Conference, discussing current security issues with other experts in the field

On January 26, the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) publishes <a href="/files/uploads/2026/01/SABs-annual-report_2025_ENG.pdf">the unclassified part of the annual report for the year 2025</a>. Along with last year&#8217;s analysis, SAB also provides forecast on the possible development of current security issues.
Russia&#8217;s goal is to weaken the West both nationally and internationally. Over the past few years, Moscow’s perception of the West as an existential threat to the ruling regime has intensified. Russia believes it has already entered a direct confrontation with the West: the struggle takes place not only in Ukraine, but also globally and ideologically. Russia’s aggravated threat perception means a significant increase of security threats for Europe, stated in the report.
To implement its influence and plans, Russia continues to use and constantly adapt existing ones, as well as create new hybrid instruments. One of the instruments that is increasingly being applied is the use of legal mechanisms in the international arena with the aim to discredit Latvia on an international level and ensure a long-term international pressure on Latvia to change its policy towards Russia and the Russian-speaking population. There is a separate chapter in the report, explaining the use of this mechanism.
In SAB’s assessment Russia will continue to pose a significant military threat to European countries and NATO. The militarization of the Russian economy will continue even after a potential conclusion or freezing of the war in Ukraine
SAB’s information shows that Russia’s perception of Latvia is becoming increasingly similar to the one Russia had of Ukraine before the war. While Russia does not pose a direct military threat to Latvia at the moment, a number of signs indicate potential long-term plans.
“Last year, when analysing the state of security situation in the region, we assessed that under the right conditions Russian military threat to NATO could substantially increase over a five-year period. Recently, various experts have been predicting it over the next two to three years. The situation has changed, the threat has increased, but curently, we are not limiting it to a certain time frame as the situation is influenced by various factors and their combination. The threat level stemming from Russia will remain high, therefore, we must work purposefully to reduce it. We must also be prepared for the fact that Russia will try to exert its influence on the upcoming parliamentary elections in Latvia this fall,” notes Egils Zviedris, director of SAB, commenting on the annual report and the current security challenges.
The classified part of the annual report will be reviewed by the Cabinet of Ministers and the National Security Commission of the Parliament of Latvia. Thereby the directions of the activities of the Constitution Protection Bureau for the year 2026 will be approved.
The full text of the report is available <a href="/files/uploads/2026/01/SABs-annual-report_2025_ENG.pdf">here</a>.
It is also possible to find out about the annual report, as well as other information disseminated by SAB on the social network X: @SAB_LV.
SAB report provides an overview of intelligence, counter-intelligence, cyber security, and classified information protection issues in 2025. The report also includes an assessment of domestic and foreign policy developments in Russia and the third countries (outside the EU and NATO), taking into account the particularly active efforts of the special services of these countries to influence the EU and NATO countries, including Latvia.
SAB is one of three Latvian state security institutions that, in accordance with the procedures established by law, conduct intelligence and counterintelligence, protect classified information, monitor critical infrastructure of information and communication technologies, and also conduct and control the exchange of classified information with international organizations.

The Constitution Protection Bureau publishes the annual report 2025

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On October 16, the Director of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB), Egils Zviedris, met with the Director of the European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) Daniel Markić. During the meeting, the directors discussed the further development and directions of EU INTCEN, as well as cooperation between SAB and EU INTCEN.
SAB has had a long term cooperation with EU INTCEN, ensuring that Latvian intelligence information and expertise help to shape the position of EU decision-makers on key issues related to European security.
The intelligence expertise of the SAB and the Baltic States in general on the security situation in the region plays a significant role in formulating EU INTCEN&#8217;s analytical assessments for the highest level EU officials," D. Markić emphasized to the director of SAB.
"It is of utmost importance to promote the unity of European countries and ensure that EU decision-makers have a common understanding of the security issues relevant to Latvia and the Baltic region. Successful cooperation with EU INTCEN is one of the key elements for this to be accomplished. Through this cooperation, our service helps to shape European security policy, which is particularly important in the context of the current regional threat," confirming the readiness to continue cooperation between SAB and EU INTCEN, stated the SAB Director.
EU INTCEN is an intelligence analysis agency of the European Union and a part of the European External Action Service under the authority of the High Representative. EU INTCEN&#8217;s analytical products are based on intelligence from the intelligence and security services of the EU member states.

SAB and EU INTCEN Directors Stress Importance of Intelligence Expertise in European Security Context

The joint Russian-Belarusian strategic military exercise, "Zapad-2025," will take place from 12 to 16 September. The exercises will be held mainly on Belarusian territory, however the military activities are also planned for Kaliningrad and the newly re-established Moscow and Leningrad military districts. The officially announced objectives of "Zapad-2025" are to simulate joint defensive and offensive operations and to improve cooperation between the Russian and Belarusian armed forces. Although the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) assesses that the military exercises pose a low level of threat to Latvia and NATO, Russia and Belarus are using "Zapad-2025" in their domestic and foreign policy strategic communication.
For a domestic audience, the Putin regime is using the "Zapad-2025" exercises to clearly convey that, regardless of the war in Ukraine, Russia is capable of developing and strengthening its military capabilities and of responding to military threats. This message is well-received in the Russian and Belarusian information space, as it emphasizes the stability of the regimes, the existence of a reliable ally, and the defensive nature of the exercises. Simultaneously, it is used to accuse Western countries of aggressive foreign policy and of worsening the security situation in the region. This, in turn, fosters anti-Western sentiment in Russian society and justifies the Putin regime&#8217;s aggressive foreign policy, especially the war in Ukraine.
As "Zapad-2025" exercises are receiving increased attention, Russia is also crafting similar foreign policy messages – regardless of the war in Ukraine, Russia is capable of developing and strengthening its military presence at NATO&#8217;s borders. To increase the strategic significance of the exercise, Russia and Belarus also carries out tactical nuclear weapon drills and demonstrate their new military equipment. The Western countries are the primary target audience of these messages, as it clearly signals Russia&#8217;s extensive military capabilities, including its nuclear capabilities.
"Zapad-2025" exercises also highlight another feature of Russian and, especially, Belarusian strategic communication: both countries are portraying themselves as responsible and pragmatic neighbors who are forced to respond to threats created by Western countries. In May this year, Belarusian officials announced that the exercises would be moved from the Belarusian western border deeper into Belarusian territory and that the scale of the exercises would be reduced — officially, fewer than 13,000 participants will take part in the exercises in Belarus. Belarus also announced that, despite the reduced scale of the exercises, it still invites international observers, including from the Baltic states, to participate. According to Belarusian officials, the main goal of these actions was to show a willingness to de-escalate regional tensions.
However, this narrative of pragmatism was quickly turned against the Baltic states and Poland. Belarusian officials spread narratives that NATO (the Baltic states and Poland) are using "Zapad-2025" as a pretext for militarization, despite the seemingly demonstrated goodwill from Belarus and Russia in reducing the scale of the exercises and moving them further away from NATO borders.
It&#8217;s highly likely that as the active phase of "Zapad-2025" approaches, Russian and Belarusian statements will become louder and information campaigns against Latvia and NATO will increase. It is also very likely that Russian and Belarusian officials will pay a close attention to narratives disseminated in NATO&#8217;s information space with the aim of dramatizing them and using them in their own information campaigns.
Overall, the military threat posed by the exercises to Latvia and NATO is assessed as low — Russia&#8217;s military and political involvement in exercises is lower than in previous years, and Russian military resources remain concentrated on the war in Ukraine. At the same time, SAB encourages residents to be vigilant and report suspicious observations in the border area, such as communication disruptions, to the authorities.
This article by the Constitution Protection Bureau is published in a series of articles on various topics that are current in society. The purpose of the series of articles is to provide expertise on important issues for Latvian society, in order to supplement the informational space with reliable information that would serve the citizens as an explanation of current processes in the country and a forecast for their development.

Moscow and Minsk uses Zapad-2025 to exert information and psychological influence

Please find below Annual Public Reports of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB). Public reports partially contain the information which is included in SAB’s report to the Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia (the Government).

Neutralisation of activities of intelligence and security services unfriendly to Latvia.

Obtaining background information on activities of foreign institutions or persons against the interests of the Latvian state.

Issuance of special permits for access to state secrets. Protection of EU and NATO classified information.

Header EN

The critical infrastructure of information and communication technologies (ICT) is the critical infrastructure of information and communication technologies included in the aggregate of the critical infrastructure approved by the Cabinet. The Constitution Protection Bureau performs cybersecurity supervision in relation to the critical infrastructure of information and communication technologies.
The legal framework for critical infrastructure of information and communication technologies currently consists of <a href="https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/14011-national-security-law">the National Security Law</a>, <a href="https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/353390-national-cybersecurity-law">the National Cybersecurity Law</a>, <a href="https://likumi.lv/ta/id/361481-minimalas-kiberdrosibas-prasibas">the Cabinet of Ministers Regulation No. 397 of June 25th, 2025 “Minimum Cybersecurity Requirements”</a>.
National Cybersecurity Law
On June 20th, 2024, the Parliament adopted the National Cybersecurity Law. The Law came into force on September 1st, 2024.
The law applies to critical infrastructure of information and communication technology, as well as providers of essential and important services.
The Constitutional Protection Bureau, in accordance with the division of supervision of entities specified in the National Cybersecurity Law, performs supervision of critical infrastrucutre of information and communication technology.
The supervision of the entity shall include control of compliance with the cybersecurity requirements, on-site checks and remote monitoring of information and communication technologies, data and document checks, including in relation to the risk management and the elimination of the deficiencies detected in conformity evaluations, and also security scanning of electronic communications networks and information systems of the entity.
Determination of the Cybersecurity Manager
Entities of the National Cybersecurity Law must appoint a person responsible for cybersecurity within the entity, i.e., a Cybersecurity Manager. the Cabinet of Ministers Regulation No. 397 of June 25th, 2025 “Minimum Cybersecurity Requirements” set out the qualifications and security requirements for Cybersecurity Managers.
The entity shall initially notify the supervisory authority of the appointment of Cybersecurity Manager no later until October 1st, 2025. If Cybersecurity Manager of the entity is determined after the abovementioned time limit, the entity shall notify the National Cybersecurity Centre and the Constitution Protection Bureau immediately, but no later than within five working days.
The owner or legal possessor of critical infrastructure of information and communication technology shall appoint a Cybersecurity Manager for a term of up to three years.
The owner or legal possessor of critical infrastructure of information and communication technology shall submit to the Constitution Protection Bureau an electronically completed and securely electronically signed Cybersecurity Manager candidate approval form for the approval of the cybersecurity candidate (<a href="https://likumi.lv/wwwraksti/2025/122/BILDES/MK_NOT_397/301296C4148F_PIEL_4.DOCX">Annex 4</a> (available only in Latvian) to Cabinet Regulation No. 397 of June 25th, 2025, "Minimum Cybersecurity Requirements").
The Constitutional Protection Bureau shall verify the compliance of the cybersecurity applicant within three months from the date of receipt of Cybersecurity Manager applicants approval form.
After Cybersecurity manager applicant has been approved, the National Cybersecurity Center and the Constitutional Protection Bureau must be notified by sending an electronically completed and securely electronically signed notification form for Cybersecurity Managers to their official electronic addresses (<a href="https://likumi.lv/wwwraksti/2025/122/BILDES/MK_NOT_397/FBC0A4B6EA87_PIEL_3.DOCX">Annex 3</a> (available only in Latvian) to Cabinet Regulation No. 397 of June 25th, 2025, "Minimum Cybersecurity Requirements").
Determination of Information System and Resource Security Classes
The entity, in accordance with the methodology set out in <a href="https://likumi.lv/ta/id/361481-minimalas-kiberdrosibas-prasibas#piel5">Annex 5</a> (available only in Latvian) to Cabinet Regulation No. 397 of June 25th, 2025, "Minimum Cybersecurity Requirements," shall determine the confidentiality, integrity, and availability class (A, B or C) for each information system and information resource category owned and controlled by the entity.
Information systems included in critical infrastructure as a whole shall be considered class A information systems, without applying the mentioned above. If the critical infrastructure as a whole includes all of the entitys information and communication technology infrastructure, the entity must coordinate the security classes assigned to its information systems with Constitution Protection Bureau. Until the entity has determined the security classes for its information systems and coordinated them with Constitution Protection Bureau, all information systems owned by entity shall be considered class A information systems.
In order to coordinate with Constitution Protection Bureau the lists of information and communication technology information systems and resources owned and controlled by the entity, the entity shall also send Constitution Protection Bureau a brief functional description of each information system and resource.
The entity shall coordinate the security classes to be assigned to information systems with Constitution Protection Bureau by sending them separately from the self-assessment report submission form.
Report on Conformity Self-assessment of the entity
In order to assess whether the entity has complied with the requirements of the National Cybersecurity Law, the entity must complete and submit a self-assessment report. In the self-assessment report, the entity must indicate the requirements it complies with and explain how this compliance is ensured. The self-assessment report must be submitted once a year by owners and legal possessors of critical infrastructure of information and communication technology and Category A information systems. The self-assessment report form has been approved by the Cabinet of Ministers (<a href="https://likumi.lv/wwwraksti/2025/122/BILDES/MK_NOT_397/BC693FFE97F4_PIEL_16.DOCX">Annex 16</a> (available only in Latvian) to Cabinet Regulation No. 397 of June 25th, 2025 “Minimum Cybersecurity Requirements”).
The self-assessment report shall be submitted to the supervisory authority for the first time no later than October 1st, 2025.
Cryptography guidelines
Based on the provisions of Paragraph 84 of Cabinet Regulation No. 397 of June 25th, 2025, "Minimum Cybersecurity Requirements," the National Cybersecurity Centre in cooperation with Constitution Protection Bureau, develops, reviews at least once a year and, if necessary, updates guidelines for entities on the use of cryptography solutions. The purpose of the guidelines is to help entities ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information by using appropriate cryptographic solutions and management processes. The guidelines are available <a href="/files/uploads/2025/10/20250912-Kriptografijas-vadlinijas.pdf">here</a> (available only in Latvian).

Supervision of ICT critical infrastructure

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